

environmental

subjective

Harvey (1986) argues that when results from 'science' are appealed to in support of cognitions, the validity of those cognitions are presupposed – explaining the world by an appeal to the world which we are (subjectively) explaining.

Conole and Dyke (2004) sees ICT affordances as **perceived *and* actual**

Conole 2011 incorporates relational features and social contexts

Norman (1988) actual and perceived properties of things real and perceived affordance **all that can be accessed are perceptions/perceived affordances**

Norman (2008) acknowledge variant definitions for tech affordances across disciplines with the term **"signifiers"**

Akrich & Latour (1992) it is the **morality of a setting both negative (what it prescribes) and positive (what it permits)**

problematises Positivism

Positivism relying on reality existing in the space-time continuum

Gibson (1977) mediated by conventions, in the way objects offer opportunities for selection and interaction rejected the idea of social or cultural perspectives

criticises Gibson **Oliver (2005)** "essentialist position" of direct link between perception and action renders affordances "speculative rather than analytic," without utility for research - wants to abandon 'affordances'

criticises Norman

critiques Gibson's natural vision

acknowledges Norman's perceived affordances

Pea (2009) redefines affordances as **objects that link perception and action**

aligns with Scarantino, Chemero, Hutchby, Dohn, Schmidt, Bloomfield

social

Schmidt (2007) builds on Gibson's relation between perceivers and objects, properties and events in the physical environment, extending affordances to **relations between human perceivers and social environments "propertied by other people"**. The sum total of relations between an individual perceiver and their social/physical environments is an **ec niche** – "a site for individual narrative identity construction based on past, present, and potential future interactions with both physical and social environments." **Social affordances** contrast with perceptual affordances in that "they **are inherently intersubjective** (the behaviour of others in addition to my own has created them) and they exist in a temporally extended and historical fashion (past rather than present behaviour has created them)"

objective

Allen (2004) [separate reading] interactions emergent between the perceiver and their environment

Sanders (1997) Considers that the Gibsonian concept of neither subject or object but rather both "rightly signifies **relations between perceiver and perceived**".

criticises Gibson's concept of natural vision **Fenwick & Edwards (2010)** ontological problem is that via positioning them as natural phenomena, they become **"black-boxed"**.

criticises Norman's real technological affordances

agrees with Pea that affordances need social mediation

Potter & Wehtherell (1987) prefer *invisible and unquestionable*.

movement

Ingold (2011) emphasises movement through *wayfaring*

Movement is important in Gibson (1979) because humans and animals are mobile, and as they move through their environment their effectivities create actualizing circumstances that reveal affordances.

criticises Gibson for omitting the role of mental representations

Scarantino (2003) reconceptualises affordances as both **conditional** (favourable, temporal background and triggering conditions) and **relational** (reliability of potential actor's abilities/effectivities).

acknowledges Gibson's affordances as common currency

similar to Schmidt's *ec niche*

Laurillard, Stratfold, Luckin, Plowman, and Taylor (2000) predates web 2.0

Hutchby (2001) **TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINIST** new technologies -> new social relations

relational

Reed (1996) contends affordances are scarce environmental resources implicated in natural selection – **you don't know if something's edible unless you're interested in eating it.**

Reed says resources can be agentic in producing effects in human/animal behaviours

rejects Gibson's affordances as **impossible & ghostly**

criticises Michaels et al.

rejects Turvey and Reed by problematising their and Gibson's premise that affordances are animal-relative properties of the environment

Chemero (2003) affordances are relations between **aspects of animals** including humans, and **aspects of situations - abilities do not guarantee results.**

draws on Strawson

Suthers (2005, 2006) places the affordance of a technological **constraint as a relation to a feature of a situation**

functional [enabling and constraining] and relational [e.g., different for one individual than for another] aspects which frame, while not determining, the possibilities for agentic action in relation to an object"

Turvey (1992) redefined term as referring to dispositional properties of objects and environments, **only manifested in relation to actualising circumstances.**

Turvey says affordances + effectivities of humans + animals, denies agency to artefacts and environmental resources.

Strawson (1955) *feature placing* distinguishing **perception of the properties of objects** (eg cup handle) from **perception of features of situations** (eg rain).

criticises Hutchby

reflexive

Michaels, Zeinstra, and Oudejans (2001) affordance is perceiving something about ourselves rather than about the environment.

agency

Dohn (2009) asserts a relational stance cutting across subject-object fits with the embodied nature of learning

supports Gibson

conditional

Pfaffenberger (1992) social practices -> technological affordances inherently multiple, based on perception

Bloomfield, Latham, and Vurdubakis (2010) affordances are not just material, but also **bound up in features of situations and a broader sociocultural context**

affordance compass

relationship of individual with their perception of environments, and that this relationship directly links perception and action is a key question in the ontological debate

